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Abstract Based on original fieldwork data, I argue for a difference in meaning
between two focus constructions in K’iche’ (Mayan). In particular, I show that
the interpretation of focus constructions with aree ‘FOC’ gives rise to existence
and exhaustivity implications (the latter when they are used as answers), both of
which do not necessarily arise from the interpretation of focus constructions without
aree. I discuss how to analyze these implications and review previous approaches to
similar phenomena. I also develop a dynamic account that captures the empirical
generalizations I propose.
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1 Introduction
K’iche’ is a Mayan language spoken by over a million people in the central and
western highlands of Guatemala (Richards 2003). In K’iche’, there is a designated
focus position preceding the predicate as shown in (1).1 Expressions in this position
can be preceded by the so-called focus particle aree ‘FOC’ as in (2).
(1) A
CLF
Raul
Raul
x- /0-war-ik.
CMP-A3-sleep-SS
‘RAUL slept.’
(2) Aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul
Raul
x- /0-war-ik.
CMP-A3-sleep-SS
‘It was RAUL who slept.’
This paper investigates meaning differences between the two focus constructions
exemplified in (1) and (2). I show, on the basis of original fieldwork data, that the
∗ I thank my consultants as well as Carl Pollard, Judith Tonhauser, Jefferson Barlew, Manjuan Duan,
Greg Kierstead and the Syntax-Semantics Discussion Group “Synners” at Ohio State for helpful
discussions. Many of the ideas presented here grew out of long discussions with Carl Pollard and I
gratefully acknowledge his insights. Of course, the usual disclaimers apply. The fieldwork for this
project was supported by the Tinker Field Research and Global Gateway Research Grants as well as
the Department of Linguistics and the College of Arts and Humanities at Ohio State.
1 The K’iche’ data presented here come from original fieldwork in Santa María Tzejá, Ixcán, Guatemala.
I use the following glosses: A1(P), A2(P), A3(P) = absolutive first, second, third person singular
(plural); E1(P), E2(P), E3(P) = ergative first, second, third person singular (plural); CLF = classifier;
CMP = completive; DET = determiner; DIR = directional; FOC = focus particle; GEN = genitive; ICP =
incompletive; PL = plural; SS = status suffix.
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interpretation of focus constructions with aree ‘FOC’ is different from those without
it. In particular, the interpretation of the former, but not the latter, gives rise to
existence and exhaustivity implications (the latter when it is used as an answer2)
similar to it-clefts in English or preverbal focus in Hungarian (Delin 1992; É. Kiss
1998). Previously, this property of K’iche’ was either overlooked (e.g., Larsen 1988;
Trechsel 1993) or not explicitly shown to be the case (Can Pixabaj & England 2011).
More importantly, this finding goes against the claim that focus in Mayan has a cleft
interpretation across-the-board (Aissen 1992). Rather, I argue that sentences with
and without aree ‘FOC’ have different discourse functions in K’iche’.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, I provide a brief overview of
the relevant K’iche’ data and review the previous claims about their interpretations.
In §3, I discuss in detail the implications of focus constructions with aree. In §4,
I provide a dynamic analysis that captures the generalizations reached in §3. In
§5, I discuss the previous claims about the interpretation of related it-cleft/focus-
movement constructions. I conclude in §6 with a brief discussion.
2 Background on K’iche’
K’iche’ has an ergative-absolutive agreement system and a predicate-initial basic
word order (Larsen 1988; England 1991). As in other Mayan languages, it has a
designated pre-predicate position for focused expressions (Larsen 1988; England
1991) as exemplified in (3). I will refer to such constructions as answer focus
constructions, or answer FC for short, when they are used to answer overt questions.
(3) Context: Who slept?
A
CLF
Raul
Raul
x- /0-war-ik.
CMP-A3-sleep-SS
‘RAUL slept.’
The constituents occupying the focus position are generally understood to be
semantically “prominent” in some sense (Larsen 1988) which is reflected in the
cleft/pseudo-cleft translations into English, a standard practice in the Mayan lit-
erature3 (e.g., Larsen 1988; Aissen 1992; Trechsel 1993). A common assumption
about focus constructions has been that they are interpreted like clefts in that they
are associated with existence and uniqueness implications (Aissen 1992; Trechsel
1993). Aissen (1992: 49-50), for example, claims that focus constructions in Mayan
have a cleft interpretation by drawing on data from Tzotzil. She argues that focus
2 I use the term answer for sentences or sentence fragments which are anaphoric to overt questions. I
do not assume that every declarative sentence is an answer to an overt or otherwise inferred question
as in Roberts 1996/2012.
3 The reason why I do not follow this tradition for sentences like (3) will become clear in §3.
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constructions are associated with an existence presupposition which projects, that
is, remains an utterance implication, when such sentences are negated or turned
into interrogatives. She also argues that the denotation of the focused expression is
asserted to be the unique entity that satisfies this presupposition. Similarly, Trechsel
(1993: 42) claims that, like their translations, focus constructions in K’iche’ have an
existence presupposition, and follows Aissen in claiming that such sentences assert
that the entity denoted by the focused expression is the only entity in the domain of
discourse that has the property in question.
However, the claims about (i) the implications of focus constructions and (ii) their
behavior when embedded under entailment-canceling operators seem to be based
on English translations. In other words, the Mayan focus constructions themselves
are not shown to have these implications with the alleged behavior. As Matthewson
(2004: 389) argues, translations do not provide direct evidence for meaning. Rather,
she argues that reliable evidence for meaning can be obtained from judgments by
native speakers elicited for sentences uttered in particular contexts. Therefore,
whether focus constructions have the implications mentioned above and whether
some of these implications project under entailment-canceling operators ought to
be determined based on native speaker judgments elicited in properly constructed
contexts (Matthewson 2004; Tonhauser, Beaver, Roberts & Simons 2013).
K’iche’ has another focus construction, alongside the one in (3), where focused
expressions are preceded by the so-called focus particle aree4 ‘FOC’ as in (4a), and
where focused expressions have to occur before the predicate, given (4b,c).5 I will
refer to such constructions as aree focus constructions, or aree FC for short.6
(4) a. Aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul
Raul
x- /0-war-ik.
CMP-A3-sleep-SS
‘It is RAUL who slept.’
b.?Aree
FOC
x- /0-war
CMP-A3-sleep
a
CLF
Raul.
Raul
c.*X- /0-war
CMP-A3-sleep
aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul.
Raul
4 As aree can also be used as a copula as in (i), K’iche’ seems to behave like those languages where
the morphological focus marker is cognate with the copula in the language (É. Kiss 2006).
(i) A
CLF
Raul
Raul
aree
aree
jun
one
tijoxel.
student
‘Raul is a student.’
5 The example in (4b) is marginal for the consultants I worked with who commented that “this is not
the usual way of saying it.” Such sentences where aree and the focused expression are separated get
worse when there is more intervening material between the two expressions.
6 As we’ll see below, this construction can also be used to answer questions but this is not a requirement.
So, I reserve the term answer focus for those that do not have aree.
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Although, historically, the interpretations of the two focus constructions in
K’iche’ have not been distinguished (e.g., Larsen 1988; Trechsel 1993), in their
recent study on K’iche’ texts, Can Pixabaj & England (2011) argue that these
constructions have different interpretations. In particular, Can Pixabaj & England
(2011: 23) claim that the aree FC “operates much like English cleft in terms of usage
and meaning.” However, they provide no empirical evidence for this claim apart
from translations. Like the previous accounts, they do not show whether, say, (4a)
has implications that would justify comparing its interpretation to that of an English
it-cleft. Moreover, as Matthewson (2004: 371) points out, the relevant evidence for
such a claim cannot be obtained from texts, as one needs negative evidence, that is,
evidence for when one cannot use a cleft-like construction. What I show in this paper
is that the two focus constructions indeed differ in terms of their interpretations. In
the next section, I discuss what these differences are.
3 Implications associated with K’iche’ focus constructions
3.1 Existence implication
The first implication that distinguishes aree FCs from answer FCs is an existence
implication which acts as a constraint on the common ground (CG). This constraint
requires that there be an individual (possibly plural) with the property under discus-
sion. In (5), for example, if the existence of an individual with the relevant property
(here, having a computer) in a given domain (here, Maria’s class) is not in the CG,
then using aree is not felicitous as shown in (5b). Crucially, answer FCs are not
subject to this requirement as shown in (5a).
(5) Context: An inspector from the Ministry of Education is visiting the commu-
nity. He’s surveying all the primary school teachers about their students and
asking them questions like the following: Who (in your class) has a computer?
Who has more than two siblings? Whose parents are divorced? Maria, a
teacher, knows that in her class, Raul has a computer. When the inspector asks
his first question, she says:
a. A
CLF
Raul
Raul
(k’o
exist
jun
one
u-kematz’ib’).
E3-computer
‘Raul (has a computer).’
b.#Aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul
Raul
(k’o
exist
jun
one
u-kematz’ib’).
E3-computer
‘It is Raul (who has a computer).’
However, in a minimally different context where the existence implication is
in the CG, say, because the principal or another teacher told the inspector about
Maria’s class and Maria knows that the inspector knows about this—call this context
(5′)—then (5b) is felicitous alongside (5a). This shows that an answer FC like (5a)
can be used whether the CG satisfies the existence implication or not, but the aree FC
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can only be used when it is satisfied. To show that this implication is a presupposition
of aree FCs, I use a standard diagnostic called the family of sentences (FoS) tests
(Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990). These tests involve checking whether an
implication m of a declarative sentence S is projective, that is, whether it remains
an utterance implication of the FoS variants of S which are the negative of S, the
interrogative of S, a modal variant of S, and a conditional with S as antecedent
(Tonhauser et al. 2013). The FoS variants of (5b) are judged acceptable when the
CG entails the existence implication as in (6a-d) and unacceptable otherwise.
(6) Context: Same as (5′).
a. (Maria asks another teacher who’s present and knows about her class:)
Aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul
Raul
k’o
exist
jun
one
u-kematz’ib’?
E3-computer
‘Is it Raul who has a computer?’
b. Xaqri
perhaps
aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul
Raul
k’o
exist
jun
one
u-kematz’ib’.
E3-computer
‘Perhaps it is Raul who has a computer.’
c. We
if
aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul
Raul
k’o
exist
jun
one
u-kematz’ib’,
E3-computer
in
I
/0-w-eta’m
A3-E1-know
che
COMP
k- /0-u-koj
ICP-A3-E3-use
k- /0-u-b’an
ICP-A3-E3-do
etz’anem.
game
‘If it’s Raul who has a computer, I’m sure he uses it for playing games.’
d. (Another teacher who’s present and knows about Maria’s class says that
Raul has a computer and Maria says:)
Aree=t
FOC=NEG
a
CLF
Raul
Raul
k’o
exist
jun
one
u-kematz’ib’.
E3-computer
Aree
FOC
a
CLF
Roberto.
Roberto
‘It isn’t Raul who has a computer. It is Roberto.’
Since the existence implication is both a projective implication and a constraint
on context, I analyze it as a presupposition. Thus, I claim that a focus construction
of the form Aree X P, where X stands for the expression in the focus position and P
for the expression whose denotation is the property under discussion, presupposes
that there is an individual (singular or plural) with property P. In the next section I
turn to a discussion of the second property of aree FCs that can be observed when
they are used as answers.
3.2 Exhaustivity implication
The second implication that distinguishes aree FCs from answer FCs can be called an
exhaustivity implication, following much of the previous work on the interpretation
615
Yasavul
of it-cleft/focus movement constructions, e.g., in English and Hungarian (É. Kiss
1998). For these latter constructions, it has been claimed that exhaustivity amounts
to identifying the entity denoted by the focused expression as the only (or maximal)
entity bearing the property under discussion (among others, Horn 1981; Szabolcsi
1981; Roberts 1998; Percus 1997; É. Kiss 1998; Krifka 2008; Büring 2011; Velle-
man, Beaver, Destruel, Bumford, Onea & Coppock 2012). There is a considerable
amount of discussion in the literature as to how to characterize and classify this
implication, which I will discuss in detail in §5. But first I will exemplify this
implication in K’iche’ and explain why it arises. To illustrate, consider the data in
(7), which show a contrast between the two focus constructions.
(7) Context: Raul and Roberto are talking about an exam that Raul had taken that
has just been graded. He says that the teacher gave a piece of candy to those
who got 100%. Roberto asks (7a) and Raul says (7b). (7c) is unacceptable.
a. Chin
who
x- /0-r-esaj
CMP-A3-E3-take.out
juntir
all
utz?
good
‘Who got 100%?’
b. A
CLF
Juan
Juan
r-ichb’il
E3-companion
al
CLF
Maria.
Maria
/0-w-eta’m
A3-E1-know
taj
NEG
we
if
k’o
exist
jun
one
chik.
another
/
Al
CLF
Juana
Juana
xuquje’.
too
‘Juan and Maria. I don’t know if anyone else did./ Juana did, too.’
c. Aree
FOC
a
CLF
Juan
Juan
r-ichb’il
E3-companion
al
CLF
Maria. #
Maria
/0-w-eta’m
A3-E1-know
taj
NEG
we
if
k’o
exist
jun
one
chik.
another
/# Al
CLF
Juana
Juana
xuquje’.
too
‘It was Juan and Maria. I don’t know if anyone else did./ Juana did, too.’
As (7b) shows, with an answer FC it is possible for the speaker to not know
whether someone else other than Juan and Maria got 100%, or to use an additive
particle like xuquje’ ‘too’ to add another individual to the plurality of people who
got 100%. However, as (7c) shows, using an aree FC precludes such continuations.
So then the question is why the two constructions behave differently. In the previous
section, I argued that an aree FC gives rise to an existence presupposition, namely
that the (discontinuous) expression Aree...(P) is an anaphoric expression requiring
that there be an individual in the context with the relevant property. I claim that the
contrast we see in (7) arises because the antecedent in the context of the question in
(7a) is the maximal plurality of individuals with the property of getting 100%. The
aree FC identifies this plurality with the denotation of the focused expression, hence
the infelicity of the sentences following the aree FC in (7c).
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To see why the answers in (7) are about the maximal plurality of individuals who
got 100%, we need to understand the context in which (7b) and (7c) are uttered and,
in particular, what the question they are answers to contributes to the context. To that
end, I will adopt two ideas from Hamblin (1957, 1971) for the analysis of questions.
Hamblin (1957) claims that (i) a question denotes the set of its possible answers, (ii)
such possible answers are together exhaustive and (iii) mutually exclusive. Note that
it is not only that a question denotes the set of its possible answers (the so-called
“Hamblin alternatives”), but such answers are complete answers as they are defined
to be mutually exclusive.7 In addition, Hamblin (1971: 134) defines what he calls
the presumption of a question as “equivalent to the disjunction of its answers.”
The disjunction of the possible answers of a question is equivalent to an existential
quantification on the set of its possible answers. Since possible answers are complete
and mutually exclusive, the presumption of a question requires not only existence
but the unique existence of a true complete answer. Thus, in an extensional setting,
the Hamblin presumption (HP) of a question is true at a given world w iff exactly
one of the propositions in its extension at w is. Lastly, I follow Hamblin (1971:
148), who suggests that the asker of a question and, in the case of acceptance, all the
interlocutors are committed to the HP of the question.
Since possible answers are complete, a who-question like (7a) is taken as asking
for the maximal plurality of individuals with the property of getting 100%. After
acceptance, the question becomes a common question in discourse and specifying
this maximal plurality becomes a commitment of the interlocutors. Given this effect
of (7a) on the context, the contrast between (7b) and (7c) arises because in (7c)
the aree FC identifies the maximal plurality of individuals with the property of
getting 100% with the entity denoted by the focused expression8 whereas no such
identification necessarily exists in (7b). Put differently, (7b) says that Juan and Maria
are two atoms of the maximal plurality of individuals with the property of getting
100% whereas (7c) says that that maximal plurality is the plurality with the two
atoms Juan and Maria. Therefore, it is infelicitous in (7c) to continue by saying that
one doesn’t know whether there are other individuals that belong to this plurality
or that this plurality contains another atom, namely the one for Juana, whereas
no such infelicity arises in the case of (7b). In sum, the so-called exhaustivity
implication is derivable from the two properties of the aree FC when it is used as
an answer: (i) it takes as antecedent the maximal plurality of individuals with the
property in question, which in turn is supplied by the meaning of the question, and
(ii) it identifies this plurality with the denotation of the focused expression. I will,
therefore, not analyze this implication as part of the meaning of the aree FC.
7 But, certainly, pragmatics doesn’t always require answers to be complete.
8 This is similar to É. Kiss’s (2006) claim that the Hungarian preverbal focus position is a predicative
position and the exhaustivity is a result of specificational predication.
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To further illustrate the properties of the aree FC, consider the data below which
show that the way that aree FCs identify the maximal plurality of individuals with
the property in question might not always be as fine-grained as giving names. In
(8b,c), the speaker provides coarse-grained information (Ginzburg 1995) to the best
of his knowledge about the maximal plurality with the property in question.
(8) Context: Maria comes back from the kitchen and sees that the last tamale she
had left on the table is gone. She asks (8a). (8b,c) are possible answers.
a. Chin
who
x- /0-u-k’am
CMP-A3-E3-take
b’i
DIR
k’isb’al
last
sub’?
tamale
‘Who took the last tamale?’
b. Aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul,
Raul
aree
FOC
al
CLF
Maria
Maria
ema
but
k-na’taj=t
ICP-remember=NEG
chi-w-e
PREP-E1-GEN
chin
who
chi-k-e.
PREP-E3P-GEN
‘It was Raul or Maria but I don’t remember which.’
c. Aree
FOC
jun
one
chi-k-e
PREP-E3P-GEN
ri
DET
ak’al-ab’
child-PL
ema
but
k-na’taj=t
ICP-remember=NEG
chi-w-e
PREP-E1-GEN
chin
who
chi-k-e.
PREP-E3P-GEN
‘It was one of the kids but I don’t remember which.’
In (9b), the speaker is providing information about the maximal plurality, identi-
fying it with the property of being somebody that the addressee doesn’t know.
(9) Context: Raul hears footsteps out in the yard. He later asks Roberto, who was
outside, (9a). (9b) is a possible answer.
a. Chin
who
x- /0-pet-ik?
CMP-A3-come-SS
‘Who came?’
b. Aree
FOC
(k’o)
exist
jun
one
che
COMP
/0-aw-eta’m=t
A3-E2-know=NEG
a-wach.
E2-face
‘It was somebody that you don’t know.’
In (10b) and (10c), the aree FC is not used to identify an antecedent by adding
information but by revising (mis)information about it.
(10) Context: Raul and his friend Roberto are watching two cats (one black, one
white) in their yard. Roberto says (10a). Raul says (10b) or (10c).
a. X- /0-aw-il-o?
CMP-A3-E2-see
Ri
DET
saq
white
me’s
cat
x- /0-u-chap
CMP-A3-E3-catch
jun
one
tz’ikin.
bird
‘Did you see? The white cat caught a bird.’
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b. K- /0-in-b’ij
ICP-A3-E1-say
in
I
che
COMP
aree
FOC
ri
DET
q’eq
black
x- /0-u-chap-o.
CMP-A3-E3-catch-SS
‘I think it’s the black one that caught it.’
c. K- /0-in-b’ij
ICP-A3-E1-say
in
I
che
COMP
aree
FOC
jun
one
pepe
butterfly
x- /0-u-chap-o.
CMP-A3-E3-catch-SS
‘I think it’s a butterfly that it caught.’
Examples (10b,c) illustrate another point about the aree FC: its felicitous use
does not require it to be an answer to a question, as further exemplified in (11).
Note, furthermore, that the so-called “exhaustivity” does not arise in such cases: the
construction simply picks up an antecedent to provide more information about it
but the antecedent itself isn’t entailed to be maximal with respect to some property.
This shows that exhaustivity only arises in the case of questions like (7a) where an
aree FC is used as an answer since in such cases it will be identifying the maximal
plurality of individuals with the property in question.
(11) Context: Maria and Juana are talking about their friend Raul who recently went
to the nearby town. Maria says (11a) and Juana says (11b).
a. A
CLF
Raul
Raul
x- /0-u-b’ij
CMP-A3-E3-say
che
COMP
x- /0-u-k’am
CMP-A3-E3-take
lo
DIR
jun
one
sipanik
gift
ch-aw-e.
PREP-E3-GEN
‘Raul said that he brought you a gift.’
b. Jee’,
yes
aree
FOC
kab’/
candy
jun
one
puwi’
hat
(x- /0-u-k’am
CMP-A3-E3-take
lo-q).
DIR-SS
‘Yes, it was candy/ a hat (that he brought).’
To conclude this section, I will discuss two claims from Can Pixabaj & England
2011. As I mentioned above, Can Pixabaj & England (2011: 21) claim that aree
FCs have a cleft-like meaning and classify them under the heading of “contrastive”
focus. They also seem to imply that aree can only be used with definite nominals.
But as we’ve seen in (8b), (9), (10c) and (11b) such a requirement does not exist.
Second, they claim that “contrastive” focus constructions require either aree ‘FOC’
or xow ‘only’ preceding the focused expression. As I will discuss in detail in §5,
most of the literature on constructions similar to the aree FC, e.g., it-clefts in English
or Hungarian preverbal focus, claimed that their interpretations involve an only-type
meaning. However, aree and the translational equivalent of only in K’iche’ are not
interchangeable as (12) shows.9
(12) Context: Raul is a new teacher at the primary school. He knows the people in
the village but doesn’t yet know who the parents of each of his students are. At
a meeting, he asks Roberto, his fellow teacher, (12a) and Roberto says (12b).
9 The consultants I worked with used the variant xiw ‘only’ instead of xow.
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a. Chin
who
u-tat
E3-father
al
CLF
Maria?
Maria
‘Who is Maria’s father?’
b.#Xiw/
only
Aree
FOC
Carlos.
Carlos
‘Only/ It is Carlos.’
In the next section, I turn to a formal account that captures the empirical gener-
alizations I established so far.
4 Formal analysis
In this section, I sketch a dynamic analysis of the two focus constructions in K’iche’
that captures the ideas developed in §3. I couch this analysis in a dynamic framework
along the lines of Kierstead & Martin (2012) and Martin (2013). This work builds on
the line of work in dynamic semantics (e.g., Muskens 1996; Beaver 2001; de Groote
2006) that uses higher-order logic (HOL) to express the semantics. The framework I
will be using is called Dynamic Categorial Grammar (DyCG, Martin 2013) which
interfaces with a categorial grammar formalism called Linear Categorial Grammar
(LCG, Pollard & Smith 2012; Mihalicˇek 2012; Pollard 2013), which in turn is
inspired by Oehrle (1994). The underlying semantic theory used in DyCG is written
in HOL with the addition of the basic (non-logical) types e for entities, p for
propositions and w for worlds. From these basic types, complex types that can be
meanings of linguistic expressions are defined by the type constructor→, e.g., e→
p and e→ e→ p for unary and binary (static) properties, respectively.
DyCG models discourse contexts as functions from n-tuples of entities to propo-
sitions. Such a function, which is called an n-ary context, has the type cn defined in
(13) and would yield a proposition when applied to an n-tuple of entities.
(13) cn = en→ p
Intuitively, the n components of the tuple correspond to the n discourse referents
(DRs) that the context “knows about.” Vector notation is used when referring to
tuples of DRs, e.g., x: en is an n-tuple of entities and the i-th component of x, written
xi, corresponds to the i-th DR. As shorthand, I sometimes use xn to indicate that
x is of type en. DyCG follows the dynamic tradition (e.g., Heim 1983) in treating
the meaning of utterances of declarative sentences as functions from contexts to
contexts. To illustrate, the dynamic content that the sentence A cat chased a mouse
contributes is given in (14a) where the propositional constant and is of type p→
p → p. This content takes a context c, whose DRs are notated as y|c| where |c|
620
Two kinds of focus constructions in K’iche’
is the number of DRs in c, and adds two new DRs to it.10 The acceptance of this
utterance results in the update function given in (14b) where the first conjunct is
the ‘carryover’ from whatever will be the input context, and the rest arises from the
content of (14a). If the input context is “out-of-the-blue”, then this update would
yield the 2-ary context in (14c).
(14) a. λc.λy|c|,x2.(cat x0) and (mouse x1) and (chase x1 x0)
b. λc.λy|c|,x2.(c y) and (cat x0) and (mouse x1) and (chase x1 x0)
c. λx2 .(cat x0) and (mouse x1) and (chase x1 x0)
I’ll make two additions to this dynamic setup to handle questions. First, I adopt a
dynamic rendering of the Hamblin presumption which was discussed in §3.2. Recall
that the Hamblin presumption (HP) of a question is the proposition that exactly one
of the alternatives in the question denotation is true which, in static terms, amounts
to (15). Here, q: p→ p, namely, a propositional property, is the type of questions,
following Hamblin (1957).
(15) ham=def λq. exists!p.(q p) and p
The second addition involves the representation of questions in a QUD-stack
(Ginzburg 1994; Roberts 1996/2012) analyzed as a string of questions. Contexts
become functions from a vector of entities to an ordered pair whose first component
is a proposition (CG) and whose second component is a stack of questions (QUD-
stack) as in (16). Thus, (14c) is now represented as (17) where the second component
corresponds to the empty QUD-stack.
(16) cn =def en→ (p×q∗)
(17) λx2.〈(cat x0) and (mouse x1) and (chase x1 x0),<>〉
Now, assume that the question in (5), repeated below in (18), is uttered in a
context c where the existence implication of the aree FC is satisfied. Thus, both (18a)
and (18b) are felicitous. Following Hamblin, the question is assigned the meaning
in (19a). Here, I distinguish between types e (entities) and e# (pluralities); X and
Y range over the latter. person# and HAC# are distributive properties of pluralities
and HAC# abbreviates the property of having a computer. Z ranges over properties
of pluralities. (maximize X Z) is the proposition that the plurality X is the maximal
10 I use the following notational conventions: lambda-bound variables are subscripted, e.g., I write λx. a
instead of λx. a. I sometimes use a single λ for multiple abstractions, e.g., λxy. a instead of λx.λy. a.
Object-language application is left-associative, hence (fab) abbreviates ((fa)b). I eliminate outermost
parentheses, so fab abbreviates (fab) and f(ab) abbreviates (f(ab)). For any two vectors x and y, I
write x, y for their concatenation.
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plurality with property Z. Thus, the question is asking for the maximal plurality with
the property of having a computer. The HP of the question is given in (19b) which is
equivalent to (19c) where the uniqueness symbol ! is eliminated, since X is unique.
(18) Context: Who has a computer?
a. A
CLF
Raul
Raul
(k’o
exist
jun
one
u-kematz’ib’).
E3-computer
‘Raul (has a computer).’
b. Aree
FOC
a
CLF
Raul
Raul
(k’o
exist
jun
one
u-kematz’ib’).
E3-computer
‘It is Raul (who has a computer).’
(19) a. who HAC# = λp.existsX .p equals
(maximize X (λY .(person# Y ) and (HAC# Y )))
b. exists!p.p and existsX .(p equals
(maximize X (λY .(person# Y ) and (HAC# Y ))))
c. existsX .maximize X (λY .(person# Y ) and (HAC# Y ))
Note that (19c), the static version of the HP of the question in (18), is a necessary
truth since there has to be some (possibly null) plurality which is the maximal
plurality with the property in question. What is of interest is the dynamic counterpart
of (19c). Since the HP becomes a commitment of the discourse participants when a
question is accepted, the acceptance of the question in (18)11, and hence the addition
of its HP to the CG, introduces the DR X which is the maximal DR bearing the
property in question. The acceptance of the question in (18) yields the update in (20)
which has the effect of conjoining its HP to the input CG and pushing the question
onto the QUD-stack.
(20) λc.λy|c|,X .〈(pi1(c y)) and (maximize X (λY .(person# Y ) and (HAC# Y ))),
push (who HAC#) (pi2(c y))〉
Given the above model, answers are analyzed such that they take as antecedent
the DR that is introduced by the HP of the question. This way, the analysis captures
the fact that answers are anaphoric to question continuations, that is, a functional
abstraction of the non-wh part of a question.12 Depending on whether the focused
expression in the answer is indefinite, definite or some other kind of generalized
quantifier, we will have different cases. For instance, in the first case the correspond-
ing DR will be newly introduced, in the second it will be one of the old ones, and
in the third case a quantificational NP will be quantified into the focus position.
11 For simplicity, I assume that every question that gets asked is accepted. In a full-blown theory, we
need to model how questions are accepted or rejected.
12 In fact, this analysis seems to make a QUD-stack unnecessary since the question continuation is
already retrievable from the context. Rather, what we may need is to keep track of discourse topics. I
will not develop this idea here but see Yasavul & Pollard in prep for an analysis along those lines.
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To capture all of these compositionally is beyond the scope of this paper so I will
confine myself to a sketch below (but see Yasavul & Pollard in prep for an analysis).
To capture a case like (18a), I define the function ans(wer) as in (21).
(21) The dynamic content of ans x HAC#:
a. is a function which takes as its argument a context c with a nonempty
QUD-stack where the topmost question is (who HAC#),
b. asserts that the entity denoted by the focused expression is an atom of the
maximal plurality of individuals bearing the property HAC#.
As for an aree FC like (18b), recall that it takes as antecedent a DR with the
relevant property and identifies this DR with the denotation of the focused expression.
As discussed in §3.2, when there is a question that an aree FC is an answer to, the
antecedent DR is made available via the HP of the question. When there is no
question in the context, the relevant DR must be entailed to exist, either because
it is introduced by an indefinite in prior discourse or because it is weakly familiar
(Roberts 2003), that is, it is inferred to exist. The analysis below covers both of these
cases.
(22) The dynamic content of aree x HAC#:
a. is a function that takes as its argument a context c which entails that some
DR has property HAC#,
b. identifies that DR with property HAC# with the denotation of the focused
expression.
Note that I haven’t explicitly discussed how the anaphoric retrievability is cap-
tured in either of these constructions, which is why the above analyses are semi-
formal as they stand. In particular, it is possible to analyze anaphoric retrievability as
a fundamentally pragmatic phenomenon where the way that the right antecedent DR
is picked up wouldn’t be built into the meaning of anaphoric triggers like the two
focus constructions I discussed above. Especially important are cases like (18a,b)
where the property in question is elided and thus the construction needs to be able to
pick up the right DR without this property as argument. I leave it for future research
to further develop this analysis.
Although the two focus constructions in K’iche’ share certain similarities, e.g.,
both involve expressions in the pre-predicate focus position and both can be answers
to questions, their meanings are quite different. Not only does the aree FC have an
existence implication and give rise to an exhaustivity implication when it is used as
an answer, but crucially the analysis of this construction cannot be built on that of
the answer FCs (contra Bende-Farkas’s 2006 claim for the corresponding case in
Hungarian), as the former is not anaphoric to a question. However, what is common
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in the analyses of both of these constructions is that they employ continuations (see
Barker 2002, 2004). Both of the expressions formed by applying ans and aree to their
first arguments yield functors looking for the property that is obtained by abstracting
on these expressions in the respective sentences, namely, their continuations. In
other words, the denotation of both ans x and aree x are functions of their own
continuations similar to the class of constructions analyzed under the heading of
focus in the literature (Rooth 1992). This way of looking at focus constructions
suggests that every answer to a question can be considered a focus construction and
yet not every focus construction is an answer to a question.
In the next section, I discuss some prominent analyses of cleft/focus-movement
constructions in order to compare them with the account I propose.
5 Comparison with previous accounts
The discussion in this section is restricted to the literature on it-clefts in English
and preverbal focus in Hungarian, two much-discussed constructions which are
similar to the aree FC in K’iche’. As mentioned in §4, it is generally claimed that
such constructions identify the focused expression as the only or the maximal entity
with the relevant property, hence the so-called exhaustivity implication (among
others, Horn 1981; Szabolcsi 1981; Roberts 1998; Percus 1997; É. Kiss 1998;
Krifka 2008; Büring 2011; Velleman et al. 2012). For instance, it is argued that in
(23a), when uttered in a context where the existence presupposition is satisfied, the
cleft conveys that nobody other than John went to SALT or that John exhausts the
list of SALT-goers, hence the infelicity of the sentences following the cleft in (23a).
(23) Context: Who went to SALT?
a. It was John. #Bill went, too./ #I don’t know if anyone else did.
b. John. Bill went, too./ I don’t know if anyone else did.
The exhaustivity implication was analyzed as an assertion by Bolinger (1972);
Halvorsen (1978); Atlas & Levinson (1981); Szabolcsi (1981); Han & Hedberg
(2008). However, Horn (1981) and, following him, Wedgewood (2007) argued that
this analysis is problematic for English and Hungarian. In particular, if exhaustivity
was asserted, then one wouldn’t expect (24a) to be infelicitous but rather pattern like
(24b), because the cleft would be informative (examples adapted from Horn 1981).13
(24) a.#I know John went to SALT but I’ve just heard it was John who went to
SALT.
b. I know John went to SALT but I’ve just heard only John went to SALT.
13 As I alluded to above, the common assumption seems to be that the exhaustivity implication of a cleft
is somehow on a par with that of an exclusive like only. More on this below.
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Horn (1981) claimed that the exhaustivity implication should rather be analyzed
as a conversational implicature. In his analysis, Horn argues that the existence pre-
supposition of a cleft, together with what a cleft asserts, gives rise to the implication
that the individual denoted by the focused expression is the only relevant individual
with the property under discussion. According to Horn, the exhaustivity implication
follows from a quantity implicature because if there were other individuals with
the same property, the speaker would have mentioned them. The problem with this
analysis, as Velleman et al. (2012) note, is that this implicature cannot be directly
canceled as shown in (25).
(25)#It was John who went to SALT; indeed, it was John and Bill.
A third line of analysis claims that the exhaustivity implication is a presupposition
(Kenesei 1986; Szabolcsi 1994; Percus 1997; Bende-Farkas 2006; Hedberg 2013).
In some presuppositional analyses, e.g., Percus 1997; Bende-Farkas 2006; Hedberg
2013, the similarities between cleft-like structures and definite descriptions are
exploited, building on the idea that clefts conceal a discontinuous definite description,
and equating the exhaustivity implication with the uniqueness (or maximality)
presupposition of this definite description. In some of these analyses, the exhaustivity
implication of a cleft like (26) is captured by employing a universal quantifier as in
(26a) and in yet others it is captured by the iota operator as in (26b).
(26) It was John who went to SALT.
a. ∀x (went-to-SALT(x)→ (x = j))
b. j = ιx went-to-SALT(x)
c. ∃x went-to-SALT(x)
d. went-to-SALT (j)
Velleman et al. (2012) point out that the analyses of exhaustivity that employ
(26a) are problematic because taken together with an existence presupposition like
(26c), they entail (26d), the implication which is taken to be the asserted content.14
Consequently, the use of a cleft is predicted to be uninformative in contexts where
these presuppositions are part of the CG or are accommodated, despite the fact that
clefts do not sound redundant in such contexts. Moreover, (26a) does not seem to
survive under negation as examples like (27) are perfectly fine.
(27) It wasn’t John who went to SALT. It was Bill.
As mentioned above, the interpretation of exhaustivity in clefts/focus-movement
is usually taken to involve a counterpart of only. In the literature on Hungarian,
too, it has sometimes been claimed that the analysis of preverbal focus involves an
operator which is a silent counterpart of only. This covert exhaustivity operator is
14 Note that in the analysis I propose, the asserted content would not be (26d) but rather something
along the lines of (26b).
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claimed to be responsible for the “exhaustive-identification" property of Hungarian
preverbal focus as well as the syntactic movement to this position (Horvath 2000).
Velleman et al. (2012: 442) note that the idea that clefts and only-sentences are
semantically similar has resulted in analyses where the two are claimed to have the
same exhaustive meaning component. The difference, as they note, was captured
by claiming that only-sentences assert, while clefts presuppose or conventionally
implicate, exhaustivity.
Velleman et al. (2012: 442) propose a similar account where they describe it-
clefts as “inquiry terminating (IT) constructions”. An IT-construction is claimed to
mark an answer to the current question under discussion as a maximal answer and,
as a result, to resolve the question and terminate it as an active line of inquiry. In
Velleman et al.’s analysis, both only and CLEFTS, their cleft operator responsible for
the exhaustivity implication of a cleft, are characterized by using the two meaning
components MIN and MAX given in (28). Here, the subscript S indexes the current
context which includes a Current Question under discussion15 (CQS) and a salient
partial ordering over the alternatives in CQS, indicated by the entailment relations16
(≥S) and (>S). In particular, p≥S q iff p entails q, and p >S q iff p entails q and p
is distinct from q.
(28) a. MINS(p) = λw.∃q ∈CQs[q(w)∧ (q≥S p)]
“There’s a true answer at least as strong as p.”
b. MAXS(p) = λw.∀q ∈CQs[(q >S p)→¬q(w)]
“No true answer is strictly stronger than p.” (Velleman et al. 2012: 451)
According to Velleman et al., clefts and only-sentences differ in their meaning
because what is at-issue for CLEFTS, namely, (28a), is presupposed for only, and
what is at-issue for only, namely, (28b), is presupposed for CLEFTS. Consequently,
they assign (29a) to only and (29b) to CLEFTS. The two meaning components are
separated by a dot as follows: presupposed.asserted. Given (29b), Velleman et al.
would derive the exhaustivity in (26) as follows. The MIN component asserts that
there’s a true answer at least as strong as (26d), and the MAX component requires
that there is no answer stronger than (26d), and as a result one infers that John went
to SALT and nobody other than John did.
(29) a. JonlyK= λw.λ p : MINS(p)(w).MAXS(p)(w)
b. CLEFTS = λw.λ p : MAXS(p)(w).MINS(p)(w) (Velleman et al. 2012: 452)
The Velleman et al. analysis has several problems, though. First, an it-cleft
doesn’t have to resolve a question and terminate it as an inquiry. For example,
15 The term Current Question (CQ) is used to refer to the question at the top of the QUD-stack in the
sense of Roberts 1996/2012.
16 These relations may include pragmatic ordering alongside pure entailment (Beaver & Clark 2008).
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depending on the goals of the querier in (30), the clefts in (30a-c) may be taken as
identifying “the cookie-taker” to the best of the cleft-utterer’s knowledge but this
may not sufficiently answer the question for it to be popped out of the QUD-stack.
(30) Who took the last cookie?
a. It wasn’t one of the kids.
b. It was one of the kids but I don’t remember which.
c. It was John or Mary but I don’t remember which.
Velleman et al. (2012: 449) also claim that it-clefts require a question to have
been raised or discussed. They propose that the existence presupposition of a cleft is
triggered by the question it answers (Velleman et al. 2012: 456). However, an it-cleft
in English, just as the aree FC in K’iche’ (see (10) and (11) above), doesn’t require
a question to be under discussion in prior discourse. In (31),17 for example, there’s
nothing in the input context that gets the question Who robbed the BP station? onto
the QUD-stack. Rather, in (31a), the speaker B chooses an antecedent (a weakly
familiar DR), namely the one for the robber(s), since the existence of such a DR is
inferable from the existence of a robbery, and equates this DR with the denotation of
the post-copular NP. The fact that (31b) is infelicitous in this context casts further
doubt that the cleft in (31a) is an answer to a question. In (31c), the speaker B
chooses another DR, namely the one for the gas station (a strongly familiar DR).
Similar to the aree FC, an exhaustivity inference does not arise because the CG does
not entail that the antecedent DRs are maximal with respect to some property; the
cleft just picks up an antecedent DR to further identify it.
(31) A: The gas station near Bethel and River Road was robbed last night!
B: a. It was my two halfwit brothers (who robbed it).
b. #My two halfwit brothers.
c. It must be the BP station (that was robbed).
As for the meaning in (29b) that is assigned to clefts, note that MINS(p) is
actually p18 so in (26), for example, the asserted content would be (26d) which is
the same as what most of the previous accounts claimed it to be. On the other hand,
MAXS(p) will be truth-conditionally equivalent to the proposition If John went to
SALT, then nobody else did. This is the same conditional presupposition that Büring
(2011) proposed for it-clefts except that Velleman et al. claim that the meaning of
clefts are focus sensitive in that they make reference to the current QUD. Either way,
17 This example is due to Carl Pollard.
18 Velleman et al. note that p |= MINS(p), in other words p ⊆ MINS(p). The fact that MINS(p) ⊆ p
follows from the definition of MINS(p) and the fact that worlds are closed under entailment.
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such a presupposition seems unnecessary. For instance, for (32a) to be felicitous, it
is not necessary neither for the speaker to assume (32b) to be mutually known, nor
for the hearer to know or to accommodate it.
(32) Who came to see you last night?
a. It was somebody that you don’t know.
b. ps: (?) If somebody that the addressee doesn’t know came, then nobody
else did.
Lastly, a Velleman et al.-style exhaustivity account cannot be extended to cases
like (30c). To say that (30c) presupposes that no true answer is strictly stronger than
the proposition (took-last-cookie(j) ∨ took-last-cookie(m)) seems false because (30c)
implicates that there is a true answer which is strictly stronger than this disjunction
depending on who actually took the last cookie.
The analysis I developed in §4 does not have any of these problems. For one
thing, I argued that the existence presupposition has to be satisfied independently of
a question. In cases like (31), given what A says, the antecedent DR is either weakly
familiar or strongly familiar, satisfying the existential presupposition in each case.
As for cases like (30) and (32), we can simply say that the use of the cleft provides
more information about the antecedent DR.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I claimed that the two focus constructions in K’iche’ have different
interpretations, a distinction which has been overlooked or not explicitly shown in
the previous literature. In particular, I argued that the interpretation of the aree FCs
gives rise to existence and exhaustivity implications (the latter when they are used as
answers) both of which do not necessarily arise from the interpretation of the answer
FCs. This finding goes against the standard assumption that focus constructions in
Mayan are interpreted like clefts across-the-board (Aissen 1992).
I concentrated on the proper analysis of the implications of the aree FCs and
reviewed the previous accounts proposed for similar constructions like English it-
clefts and Hungarian preverbal focus. I argued that an exhaustivity implication is not
part of the meaning of the aree FCs as it only arises when this construction is used
as an answer to, say, a who-question where the antecedent that the aree FC picks
up is entailed to be maximal due to the meaning of the question. I also sketched
a dynamic analysis that captures the differences between the two constructions.
Finally, I argued that despite certain similarities, the two focus constructions in
K’iche’ receive different analyses and, crucially, that the analysis of the aree FCs
cannot be built on that of the answer FCs since the former are not anaphoric to
questions.
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